Author Tom Clancy passed away on October 1st. Clancy had made a name for himself by writing novels which pitted US intelligence officers against Soviet, Chinese and Middle Eastern adversaries. Clancy was no Shakespeare but his books were enjoyable although a bit simplistic since the USA was always a force of good and the enemies were usually the standard evil terrorists/Russians/Chinese/Iranians etc I’ve read several of his books including ‘Red Storm Rising’ and ‘Red Rabbit’ and the movie ‘The Hunt for Red October’ (based on his book by the same name) is worth seeing.
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October 5, 2013, 12:00 am
An interesting file is available from site numbersoddities. ‘German exploitation of Russian communications through Traffic Analysis during World War II‘, Prepared under the direction of the CHIEF, ARMY SECURITY AGENCY 1 May 1946 WDGAS-U, [Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 11-30-2009 pursuant to E.O. 12958, as amended. DECLAS 58017a]This is the same file as volume 9 of ‘European Axis Signal Intelligence in World War II’, already available from the NSA site. However this version is better for searching key words, as the text has been transcribed from the scanned pages.
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An interesting article with the title Pay Attention and Think Fast was posted recently at takimag by Fred Reed.Mr Reed attacks the so called ‘Fighter Mafia’, a group of US officers and civilian analysts that gained fame in the 1970’s and 1980’s by arguing that the US military and its procurement program were in dire need of reforms. Led by Colonel John Boyd the group promoted several scientific theories such as the Energy–maneuverability theory and the OODA (observe, orient, decide, and act) loop. In terms of weapon systems they were critical of overdependence on ‘magical’ technologic solutions and instead they wanted cheaper, more reliable and more numerous weapons. At the time they had the facts on their side since overreliance on technology had led to poor performance of the US military in the Vietnam War. The USAF had invested in radar and long range missiles for its fighters expecting them to destroy enemy aircraft at long ranges. They even went so far as to remove the guns from their fighters as dead weight. Unfortunately the ‘miracle’ weapons did not work as expected in battle conditions and the USAF had to hastily reintroduce guns and the necessary training for its pilots. Now to every point there is a counterpoint. Here are some interesting quotes from the article: 'Their song was, and is, that America needed simple, robust, reliable weaponry such as the Soviet Union was said to have, instead of the over-technologized equipment that the US favored. The M1 tank “wouldn’t work,” they said, because sand would destroy its turbine engine, because it would be helpless if its electronics failed, and because the driver’s compartment was so small that only a midget could fit in it. (So help me, they said this.) The F15 fighter was too big, too heavy, too lacking in maneuverability for air-to-air combat, and its use of radar and BVR missiles—Beyond Visual Range—was flatly unworkable. (I hear eyes glazing over, but military guys will be interested.) In particular, the AIM-7 Sparrow radar-guided missile “wouldn’t work.”‘The Reformers were, except for Lind, con men. They were also spectacularly wrong, as the Gulf War was to prove. More of this shortly.’
Here is another quote that will probably anger fans of Russian tanks! ‘Covering them was fascinating if depressing. They said that Soviet armor was “simple and robust.” I went to Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland and talked to the enlisted men who worked with captured Soviet tanks. Yes, they said, the Russian tanks were simple, but robust? They broke down constantly and were exhausting to drive because of stiff manual transmissions.’‘They regularly (and, I think, deliberately) confused complex with unreliable.’ ‘Long-range missiles were in their infancy and did not work terribly well. Ignoring the common experience that what works sort of today will work a lot better tomorrow and like gangbusters by next Thursday, Boyd and the Fighter Mafia wanted a philosophical Sopwith Camel.’
Quoting from Air Force Magazine: ‘What really took the ginger out of the Reform movement was the Gulf War. In that war, high technology undeniably worked. Its star performers included the much-maligned F-15 and all of the other systems that had been attacked by the Reformers.Of the 40 USAF aerial victories, 33 were by F-15s. As for weapons used, 23 of the victories were by AIM-7Ms, five were by AIM-9Ms, and only two were with guns.’ These are interesting arguments and although I haven’t read extensively on the ‘Fighter Mafia’ I do understand some of the concepts they introduced. For example their opposition to the F-15 was due to the cost of the aircraft and the fact that the USAF was constantly building heavy planes with a low ratio of power/weight. Such planes suffered in terms of maneuverability and acceleration compared to the more lightweight Soviet fighters. As for the criticism on radar and long range missiles it is still valid today. A plane that has stealthy exterior but a powerful radar will be like a flashlight in a dark room. If it uses it will signal its position to the enemy. If it doesn’t then it will be flying in the dark. Also long range missiles like the AIM-7 had a poor record in combat. The AIM-120 is supposed to be lethal but it has only been used against opponents like Iraq and Serbia…Moreover one should be careful in evaluating complex weapon systems based on their performance against a developing country. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq did not have the military equipment or the training to go head to head with the US. (However he did have equipment that was quite good for the time, including T-72 tanks and Mig-29 fighters. I am also skeptical of the counterargument that Iraqi forces had ‘monkey’ models of Soviet weapons. Those are Russian excuses for the poor performance of their weapon systems) In any case I think both sides have valid arguments.
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In the course of WWII the Germans conquered and occupied most European countries. In order to get intelligence from the occupied areas and to form resistance groups the Allies sent spies equipped with radio sets. The German agencies responsible for monitoring illicit radio transmissions were the Radio Defence Corps of the Armed Forces High Command – OKW Funkabwehr and the similar department of the regular police – Ordnungspolizei. Both agencies operated in the occupied countries but they were assigned different areas. These agencies not only monitored the agents’ traffic but in many cases they were able to locate the site of transmissions through D/F (direction finding). In such cases the radio center was raided and often the operator and his cipher material were captured. This cipher material was then used by Dr Vaucks agents section to identify the crypto-systems, solve them and decode the traffic. This section, headed by Dr Wilhelm Vauck, was originally part of the Army’s signal intelligence agency OKH/In 7/VI but worked closely with the Radio Defense Corps. It was established in 1942 and by the end of the year two-man teams were detached to regional Aussenstellen in Paris, Marseilles, Lyons, Prague, Oslo, Vienna, Brussels. In late 1943 the entire department was moved to the OKW Funkabwehr.According to postwar reports they usually had success with a system if it had been physically compromised. However in some cases it was possible to solve enemy systems cryptanalytically. Now I’ve tried to find more about the work of dr Vauck but I’ve hit a brick wall.Still there’s more than one way to skin a cat… Here is a report of Referat Vauck for February 1944:
Referat 12:In the O.U. Zinna were processed the traffic of the LCA network with the agent callsigns QYZ, WOS, RCJ, SFY, PYM, ROY, SIA, OIN, REF, furthermore the lines 9171 (SAM), 9811 (VY, RQ), 175 (SPE), 9853 (RGE ) and 9815 (without Ag.Z.). Among the latter, cipher documents were received from the colleagues detached to the branch control centre in Paris (Aussenleitstelle Paris). Further, in the case "Normandy" address material that turned up was deciphered and the courier cipher (Playfair) was reconstructed. 8 courier letters of the Belgian ND (Nachrichtendienst — intelligence service) and further address material were deciphered (ez.mäßig — entziffungsmäßig gelöst). The department itself deciphered 372 messages from the LCA network. In the ongoing 8 Gv plays (Gv — Gegenverkehr, counter traffic, radiogame) in the region of Paris 101 messages were deciphered and enciphered.The processing of line 3014, Paris-Moscow, has been completed after decryption of the last 19 messages. No report has yet been received from Brussels about the work of Uffz. Richter and Miersemann, who have been detached there. Also from Lyon and Marseille are there still no work reports.During this month 262 messages from the Czech MBM network were broken (decrypted). By analyzing the solution it was possible to secure further parts from the presumed book used as a cipher key. 65 messages of the Rote Drei were decrypted, so that now 382 broken messages are available. The order for a cipher change — transition to fixed mixed Caesars — was detected in mid-December. The change of the cipher key book happened already at the beginning of August 42. The key for the Sissy-messages resulted in the solution of a message from December 42.To understand the incoming but still unresolved traffic arriving at Ag WNV / Fu a cooperation was started with the responsible person there, Uffz. Kegel. Total output of the unit in the month of February 819 messages.Regarding the ‘Normandy’ case according to Wilhelm Flicke’s ‘War Secrets in the Ether’ vol2, p244‘Normandy case’ (French Section) – When German radio defense picked up two agents in Montlucon on 1 May 1944, an Englishman, Major Southgate, fell into the net. Since January 1942 he had built up in France in the areas of Tours, Poitiers, Limoges and Toulouse special transmitting groups and had organized numerous parachute deliveries of arms and explosives. A study of the captured material enabled the Germans to identify 62 places used for parachute drops. The LCA net refers to Western agents. What agencies were using the call signs mentioned in the German report? SOE? Free French? Poles? All of the above? Some of the same agents callsigns appear in the report PWIS(H)/KP/694- 'Report on Interrogation of PW Gefr WEIGEL, Fortunat - German Wireless Intercept and SD Activities'– May 1945
Weigel was a member of Aussenstelle Paris in 1944.
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October 10, 2013, 1:47 am
An interesting file is available from site marksrussianmilitaryhistory. It is a report of the Soviet 10th Tank division, detailing the operations of the unit during June and July ’41. According to site niehorster.orbat.comat the start of the German invasion the 10th division had the following tanks: 181 BT-7, 30 T-26 and OT-26, 51 T-28, 38 T-34 and 63 KV for a total of 363. The unit suffered heavy losses in the Ukraine, which according to table VI came to 100 BT-7, 24 T-26, 44 T-28, 32 T-34, 56 KV for a total of 256 vehicles. Basically the unit was demolished.The report is useful because it gives information on the reliability and combat performance of Soviet tanks, especially the new KV and T-34 types. Let’s have a look at parts of the report that I found especially interesting:TECHNICAL REPORT FROM THE 10th TANK DIVISION, AUGUST 1941 [The original Russian transcript came to me from Mr. Charles Sharp. It is a report signed by the commander of the 10th Tank Division, dated 2 August 1941.) III. Equipment Performance During the fighting every vehicle accrued at least 135 engine hours, and from 22 June through 9 July 1941 wheeled vehicles traveled approximately 300 km. From the beginning of combat operations until 2-3 July each combat vehicle was operating an average of 10 to 13 hours each day, and during this time the situation was such that there was no opportunity to carry out the appropriate mechanical inspections, which could not but affect vehicular performance. The operating conditions for the vehicles were unbelievably severe. The terrain itself where the tanks were operating was broken, marshy in some places and sandy in others. Most of the bridges were able to support light vehicles. Vehicular loads were excessive since missions, as a rule, were drawn up without considering the mechanical state of the machines. Movements were sometimes up to 200 km a day—for example, those to Volochissk, Proskurov, and the Ulanov area (Petrikovtsy). IV. Characteristics of the KV and T-34 Tanks KV and T-34 tanks basically possessed high combat qualities: strong armor and good armament. On the battlefield KV tanks smashed enemy armor and in every instance their tanks retreated. The division’s soldiers and commanders spoke of their tanks as very reliable machines. But along with these qualities they had the following defects: 1) For the KV tanks: a) Under the impact of shells and large-caliber bullets, the turret ring and armored cupolas can jam. b) The diesel engine has little reserve power, resulting in it being overloaded and overheating. c) The main and side clutches break down. 2. For the T-34: a) Hull armor is penetrated at 300 to 400 meters by a 37-mm antitank round. Side armor is penetrated by a 20-mm antitank round. When crossing ditches the low set of the vehicle causes its nose to dig in, and traction with the ground is insufficient due to the relative smoothness of the tracks. b) With a direct hit by a shell the driver’s front hatch collapses. c) The vehicle’s treads are weak—any round takes them off. d) The main and side clutches break down. All defects of the KV and T-34 tanks, along with recommendations, were reported in detail to the chief of the Main Automotive-Armored-Tank Directorate [nachalnik Glavnago avtobronetankovogo upravleniya], Lieutenant General of Tank Troops Fedorenko, and the chief of the Automotive-Armored-Tank Directorate of the Southwest Front, Major General of Tank Troops Morgunov. Comment: Despite saying that ‘The division’s soldiers and commanders spoke of their tanks as very reliable machines’ the report also mentions serious problems with the engine, clutches and tracks of the T-34 and KV. Considering the distances covered and the fact that, according to the report, only limited repairs were possible this is not unexpected. However the performance of the armor under fire is not what one would expect. In theory both tanks should have been secure from the German 37mm A/T gun and even the 50mm gun of the Panzer III at most combat ranges. Yet the report says that simple hits rendered the KV non-operational by jamming the turret ring and the T-34 is stated to be vulnerable to the 37mm at 300-400 meters. Even the lowly 20mm seems to have been capable of disabling the mythical T-34 tank! These statements may be exaggerations/mistakes or alternatively they could be proof of problems in Soviet tank construction in 1941. ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… During combat operations the division’s repair resources accomplished the following: Comment: If we take the ratio of faults per vehicle then only the KV has a ratio of over 1, the rest of the vehicles are below 1. Alternatively one can say that 24% of the T-34’s and 35% of the KV’s needed serious (medium) repairs.………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… Of the 800 wheeled vehicles brought into the campaign there were lost: 210 in combat; 34 due to mechanical failures or lack of fuel and lubricants and then left behind with their drivers and surrounded by the enemy; 2 destroyed at a collection point for damaged machines when they could not be evacuated during the general retreat; 6 vehicles were stuck in bad terrain and impossible to evacuate; and 41 were abandoned during their units’ retreat due to mechanical failures and the impossibility of repairing them. So from these figures, of 307 combat vehicles the division lost 153, or 50%, on the battlefield the; stuck in bad terrain—21, or 7%; destroyed at collection points for damaged vehicles—20, or 7%; and lost due to mechanical failures and the inability to repair or evacuate them—95, or 31%. Thus, almost half of the combat vehicles were put out of service as a direct result of combat, but the greater part of the second half were lost due to mechanical failures during the division’s retreat or destroyed at collection points for damaged machines. Comment: It was to be expected that during a retreat many damaged but salvageable vehicles would be lost when the enemy overruns them. This was a common occurrence in WWII.
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October 11, 2013, 6:11 am
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October 14, 2013, 12:36 am
I have already given an overview of the main cryptologic systems used by the British SOEorganization in WWII here. The basic systems were double transposition using a poem as a ‘key’ generator, double transposition with prepared ‘keys’ and letter one-time pad.A more detailed analysis of the SOE ciphers and their indicator system is available from report CSDIC (UK) S.I.R. 1106‘German wireless intercept and counterespionage activities’ (Nov ’44) by Miersemann, a member of Referat Vauck. Double transposition using a poem as a keyStandard double transposition system using a poem as a ‘key’ generator. The words of the poem are assigned a letter of the alphabet and the indicator is made up of the letters assigned to the words used in the numerical key. Then the indicator is coded by using the agents secret number. For example if the letters are MLOQY and the secret number is 23116, then the indicator becomes M+2, L+3, O+1, Q+1, Y+6= OORPE.The indicator is placed as the first group of the message. The last group is again the indicator but coded one more time with a different procedure. Using the following table OORPE becomes EEHFO.
Double transposition with prepared keys Standard double transposition system using prepared numerical keys (WOK-Worked Out keys). Each set of keys has its own indicator. The indicator is placed as the first and last group of the message. The second group of the message is the agents’ secret identity code. This is coded using the following table: For example if the agents unique code is JTA then the 5-letter group is created as follows. First letter is random let’s say C, second letter equals a number based on the table above. For example H=8. This means that the letters of the agents code are moved forward 8 steps, so: T+8=BSo the group will be CHRBI
Letter one-time pad and emergency LOP Random letter ‘key’ coupled with the plaintext is substituted using a conversion table. According to Miersemann the indicator of each key is enciphered by adding a standard number (probably different for each agent). For example in the indicator OORPE 2 is added to O and 8 to P, which means that the new indicator will be OQRXE. This is the first and last group of the message.The second message group contains the agents’ secret number by using a number to letter table. This is created by using the cipher indicator OQRXE. The numbers 1-9 plus 0 at the end are written out horizontally and the indicator beneath them. Then the rest of the alphabet letters are written out, omitting those used in the indicator. In our example: If the secret number is 210 then this can be written as UGF. Two dummy letters are inserted at the beginning to form a 5-letter group. In the emergency LOP three poems are used to create new ‘keys’ to be used with the conversion table. While writing this piece I thought of the pigeon message mentioned some time ago in the media. The first group AOAKN is repeated at the end so it must have been the indicator. If the message was WOK then the second group HVPKD could be interpreted as follows: H dummy letter, V=2 using the WOK conversion table, PKD=agents id code, minus two step=NIB. So maybe the Brits can find out who agent NIB was. If the message was LOP then the group HVPKD could be interpreted as follows: using the indicator AOAKN the conversion table is: Assuming that HV are dummies, then this means that PKD=748.
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October 17, 2013, 1:17 am
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October 18, 2013, 1:27 am
Some time ago I received this request by mr Mark Blair:‘DF-120 (TICOM 2794) makes reference to another document, TICOM 2795 "Determination of the Absolute Setting of the AM-1 (M-209) by Using Two Messages with Different Indicators".
Do you know if that document has been declassified, and if it is available anywhere?’
This is TICOM report DF-105 ‘Determination of the absolute setting of the AM-1 (M-209) by using two messages with different indicators’.I don’t have this file but anyone can request it from the NSA’s FOIA office. If you do get it please share!
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October 20, 2013, 2:26 am
I’ve given an overview of the cipher systems used by the Soviet NKVD organization and their exploitation by German codebreakers here.Two of the most important systems were the ciphers used by the operational troops of the NKVD for communications from Regiment upwards. From German reports it is possible to identify their original designation and the one given to them by the Germans. According to Alexis Dettmann, head of cryptanalysis at the German Army’s cryptanalytic centre in the East Intercept Control Station East - HLS Ost the high level systems were:
These enciphered codes were used on the links GUP NKVD-Front staff-Division-Brigade-Regiment. A monthly report of Inspectorate 7/VI says that the main cipher system of the security and operational troops of the NKVD (Sicherungs u operative Truppen NKWD) had the original designation 039W and the German designation was R4 ZC 1100 (4 figure code with additive encipherment).The replacement was 049W, introduced in September 1944 (with the exception of the 4th Ukrainian front). The German designation was R4 ZC 2750. This code was enciphered twice with numerical sequences. Despite this fact it was possible to solve messages due to mistakes in encipherment and stereotyped beginnings.This information complements and supports the validity of TICOM report DF-112, written by Dettmann.
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October 20, 2013, 11:57 pm
The Al Jazeera media organization released an excellent documentary on the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In the first episode at about 27:38, a Palestinian who took part in the conflict says something very interesting. On the first day of the war the Syrians captured an Israeli station on Mount Hermon. Once the facility was secured Soviet and East German personnel came and removed the equipment. What kind of equipment could it be? Since it was a major Israeli signal intelligence outpost they were possibly cipher machines and specialized sigint equipment… Well played comrades!
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October 22, 2013, 4:26 am
Since author Tom Clancy passed away this month it is only fitting that I review one of his books. Red Storm Rising was his second published book, way back in 1986. At that time the Soviet Union ruled over a large part of the planet and its military forces were equipped with modern equipment. Although the ‘evil empire’ was close to collapse nobody knew it at the time. After the defeat of the USA in the Vietnam War, the late 1970’s –early 1980’s saw a resurgence of Soviet influence in global politics. US president Ronald Reagan countered the Soviets by starting an arms race and by supporting anti-Soviet forces in Eastern Europe and in Afghanistan. In that sense Clancy’s book is a product of the Reagan militarism of the 1980’s. The roles are clearly defined with the Soviets being evil and trying to conquer the world while the Americans are the force of democracy and freedom. The Soviets have numbers on their side, while the Americans have to rely on technology and initiative. It sounds a bit simplistic but I think that in this book it works out.The story starts in the Soviet Union when a group of Afghan ‘freedom fighters’ attacks an important Soviet oil facility and manages to blow it up. The shortfall in oil production has catastrophic consequences for the already faltering Soviet economy and thus the Soviet leadership decides to conquer the Middle Eastern oil fields. Since this action will lead to a global war the KGB carries out an attack against the Kremlin that leads to the death of schoolchildren and pins the blame on a West German national. This gives them an excuse to attack West Germany for supposedly organizing this attack.Initially the NATO forces are caught by surprise and suffer serious reverses. Soviet naval troops manage to occupy Iceland and the fighting in Germany is going badly for the Western side. The Soviet goal in the Atlantic is to shut down the transfer of troops and munitions from the US to Europe. In order to achieve that goal they rely on long range bombers equipped with cruise missiles. Their first attack against a US convoy leads to heavy losses for the US side and even carriers are sunk. The Americans then respond by attacking the bomber bases and retake Iceland.In Germany the fighting is costly for both sides but the NATO countries use their superior airforces to stop the Soviet attack and a surprise counterattack by the new M1 Abrams tanks breaches the Soviet front and dismantles their rear positions. With their conventional attack defeated the Soviet leadership is ready to authorize the use of nuclear weapons. This disastrous scenario forces General Alekseyev (commander of the Soviet forces in the West) to take matters into his own hands and using a loyal division he storms the Politburo and arrests the communist leadership. The book ends with both sides coming to the negotiating table but with NATO having the upper hand militarily.
It should be noted that although the Soviets are the bad guys they are not all evil. The communist politicians and the KGB are shown to be duplicitous and amoral but the military officers are brave, honorable and willing to sacrifice themselves in order to achieve victory.One thing that can be held against Clancy is that in order for the good guys to win some weapon systems do things that they were not designed to do in real life! For example the US forces use the stealth aircraft F-117 (called F-19 in the book) to take out Soviet long range radar planes. The problem is that this plane was not designed for aerial warfare but for ground attack missions. In another part of the book the naval F-14 fighters use their long range missiles in order to shoot down Soviet bombers. First of all long range missiles of that era had a very poor record. In this specific case things would be even worse since the F-14’s did not use their radar for guidance but instead relied on the onboard optical system… Overall this is an enjoyable novel, although a bit dated. You will get most out of it if you are already interested in the military equipment of that era.
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October 24, 2013, 11:47 pm
According to the Guardian new documents from whistleblower Edward Snowden reveal that the NSA spied on the private communications of 35 world leaders. Surprisingly it seems that the Americans did not get much out of this operation: But the memo acknowledges that eavesdropping on the numbers had produced "little reportable intelligence’’.
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October 26, 2013, 11:15 pm
Here is something for my Italian friends. There are some interesting files in the US National Archives and Records Administration, in collection RG 457, entry P-11. I don’t have the means to copy these documents by maybe someone else does. In that case here is what you need to know:23 - 5472N - lists of Captured Italian Documents -1943 -1945 51 - 7353N - PAl Instructions for the Use of the Italian Army Mnemonic Re-encipherment System "S" TICOM 75551 - 7354N - PAJ Instructions for the Use of the Italian Army Grille Cipher System "K2" TICOM 756 51 - 7355N - PAJ Instructions for the Use of Secret System for Indicating Topographical Positions, TICOM 75751 - 7356N - PAJ Explanation of the Italian System of Re-ciphering with Blocks of Subtractive Tables. Army. TICOM 758 51 - 7357N - PAJ Description of the Italian Army Cipher System ‘W’ TICOM 75951 - 7358N - PAJ Additive Re-encipherment Systems -Italian, TICOM 760 114 - 10185 - 4 PAJ G-2 intelligence Report D-137: The Italian Republican Intelligence Service, TICOM115 - 10767 - "Italian Communications Intelligence Organization". Report by Adm. Maugeri with U.S. Navy Introduction 140 - 42134N - PCH 99999 BB Cryptographic Codes and Ciphers: Italian Codes System Referred to As "E-2"140 - 42135N - PCH 99999 Cryptographic Codes and Ciphers: Italian Code Referred to as "Cifrario Speciale" 142 - 45470 PCH CAMJ6 - Codes and Ciphers: Italy167 - 47712A - Italian Cryptography 167 - 47709A - Interrogation Reports - ItalianIf you do get these files please put them online so we can all read them!
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October 30, 2013, 12:30 am
The Seabourne reports describe the organization and operations of the Luftwaffe’s signal intelligence agency in WWII. They were written in the postwar period by the US authorities.
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November 2, 2013, 11:50 pm
In May-June 1940 Germany shocked the world by defeating the combined forces of France, Britain, Holland and Belgium in the Battle of France.At the time no one expected that the French forces would be defeated in such a short campaign. During the interwar period the French Army was thought to be the best trained and equipped force in Europe. On the other hand Germany had only started to rearm in the 1930’s. The sudden collapse of France led to a search for the reasons of this strange defeat. There was no shortage of excuses. Every part of France’s defense strategy came under attack, from the old Generals of WWI that tried to control the battle from the rear to the funds wasted building the Maginot line.General Gamelin who commanded the French forces told Churchill that the defeat was due to: ‘Inferiority of numbers, inferiority of equipment, inferiority of method’. Was that true? Considering the role played by the German Panzer divisions in cutting off the northern part of the front it is important to have a look at their strength.Did the Germans have more tanks than the Franco-British Alliance? According to Panzertruppen vol1, p120-121 the German Panzer divisions used in the Battle of France had the following strength on May 10 1940:The same source gives the following losses at the end of the battle in page 141: How did the German tank strength compare with the Allies? According to The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West, p37-38 the French Army had in the Northeastern Front 3.254 tanks, the British Expeditionary Corps had 310 plus 330 in transit from the UK, the Dutch Army had 40 armored vehicles and the Belgian Army roughly 270. Total for the Allies came to 4.204. So in the field of tanks the Germans were definitely outnumbered. If we look at tank types it’s easy to see that they were also outgunned. Their main vehicles were the Panzer I and Panzer II. The first had only two machineguns and the second a 20mm gun. Against Allied tanks equipped with guns of 37mm caliber and over they were cannon fodder. The German victory was not due to a numerical or qualitative superiority in armored vehicles. Instead it had to do with the way they used their armored forces, grouping them together, supporting them with ample airpower and providing them with dedicated infantry, anti-tank, artillery and communication units.
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November 4, 2013, 10:57 pm
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November 7, 2013, 1:56 am
A very interesting report is available from site dtic online. This is the report Operational research in Northwest Europe , the work of No. 2 Operational Research Section 21 Army Group.(originally found through world of tanks forum user GhostUSN)The No2 research section teams followed the Allied ground troops and estimated the performance and effectiveness of Allied weapons and tactics by gathering data from the battlefield.
There are separate chapters for airpower, artillery, tanks and infantry weapons.The tank part has interesting information on Allied and German tanks. The superior performance of the German 75mm tank/AT gun versus Allied tanks is proven beyond doubt: There is also mention of the tendency of the Sherman tank to burst into flames when penetrated by a round:
Table I has a sample of German tank losses for the period 6 June-7 August 1944: Table VIII has the statistics of ‘brewing up’ for German and Allied tanks:Table X shows the superior performance of the Panther tank’s frontal armor:The British report calls the sloped armor ‘outstanding’.Chapter 11 has tables on the losses of Allied tanks in the period of exploitation after crossing the Seine:
As expected mechanical losses outnumber losses by enemy fire. It also seems that the ‘reliable’ Sherman tank that presumably never broke down needed spare parts just like all the other vehicles of WWII. Overall this is a fascinating study and at 388 pages it is not an easy read.
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November 11, 2013, 3:34 am
In the field of signals intelligence and codebreaking Poland, despite being a small state, distinguished itself by being the first country to solve messages enciphered with the German military’s Enigma machine.However the Poles did not have similar successes in the field of crypto-security. Their diplomatic, intelligenceand resistance movement codes were regularly read by the Germans prior and during WWII.An interesting case is the solution of the main Polish diplomatic code by the codebreakers of the German High Command’s deciphering department – OKW/Chi, during the 1930’s.Details on the Polish code are available from TICOM report DF-187G, pages 11-19. This report was written by Wilhelm Fenner, head of the cryptanalysis department of OKW/Chi. According to Fenner the Polish code used since the 1920’s was 4-figure. Through repetitions in the code values the Germans deduced that this code was enciphered with a simple substitution of the digits. Obviously this system offered limited security. Simply by comparing each day’s most frequent code groups it was easy to figure out the daily substitution. Another serious mistake made by the Poles was that the substitution table for the month was not created randomly but instead had systematic features that helped the Germans in recreating them. Later on the substitution system was replaced with a more secure additive system. Again however the Poles made the mistake of taking half measures. The additive sequences used to encipher the 4-figure code were too short, and they were used for long period of time. This led to messages being enciphered with the same sequences and these ‘depths’ could be exploited by OKW/Chi. Only during the late 1930’s was the security of this system upgraded by using long additive sequences and having different enciphering tables for incoming and outgoing traffic. Of course one can argue that by then it was too late to make a difference.During the war the Poles continued to use additive sequences but these were read by the Germans. This however doesn’t mean that these systems could be exploited at will by them. Instead it was necessary to intercept as much material as possible and to use special cryptanalytic equipment.
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November 14, 2013, 12:23 am
During WWII all the participants had some success in intercepting and decoding the radio traffic of enemy military units. Another type of traffic that proved to be very important for military operations was the traffic of the railways organization. By monitoring the movement of troops and supplies it was possible to identify the buildup of troops at specific areas of the front and thus anticipate enemy movements.The codebreakers of Bletchley Park attacked the traffic of the German Railways - Deutsche Reichsbahn and started solving messages of the Eastern European network in 1941. Through this traffic they were able to monitor the movement of men and supplies to the East. The German Army’s codebreakers were able to solve the code used by the NKVD railway troops and thus they also got information on the movement of supplies and the concentration of forces in specific areas of the front.According to ‘Delusions of intelligence’, p46:‘This same Heer station had broken into the British railroads codes by late November 1943 and claimed a 98 percent success rate in reading the two thousand plus signals produced by twenty-six keys in December 1943. Although not considered vital in peacetime, such intelligence on Britain proved important by providing information on the movement of troops and supplies.’ Obviously the solution of this traffic could have compromised the security of operation ‘Overlord’. More details are available from the reports of the relevant unit NAAS 5 (Nachrichten Aufklärung Auswertestelle - Signal Intelligence Evaluation Center). This was the cryptanalytic centre of KONA 5 - Signals Regiment 5, covering Western Europe.The reports E-Bericht 1/44 and E-Bericht 2/44 state that the code used by the radio network of the railways (Engl. Eisenbahnfunknetz) was solved almost completely in December 1943 and January 1944. In December ’43 26 ‘keys’ and 2.304 messages were solved.
In January ’44 24 ‘keys’ and 1.871 messages were solved.
However in February ’44 the code was changed and from 16 February no such traffic was intercepted. The solution of this traffic in the period that the Anglo-Americans were preparing the invasion of Western Europe may have given the Germans clues about the concentration of forces in the Southern areas of the UK. Sources: Delusions of intelligence, E-Bericht NAAS 5, Kriegstagebuch Inspectorate 7/VI
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